

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE


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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS  
AND INTERFERENCES

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Ex parte STEVE BECK and SCOTT ERIC LIPSKY

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Appeal No. 2006-0853  
Application No. 09/721,441  
Technology Center 3622

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HEARD: July 25, 2006

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Before OWENS, LEVY, and NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judges.  
LEVY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

This is a decision on appeal from the examiner's final rejection of claims 15 and 30-34. Claims 18-26 have been withdrawn from consideration.

We REVERSE.



BACKGROUND

The appellant's invention relates to Internet advertising techniques (specification, page 1). In particular, the invention includes a facility for analyzing the effectiveness of online advertising and dynamically targeting online advertising messages to users (id.).

Claim 15 is representative of the invention, and is reproduced as follows:

15. One or more computer memories collectively containing an advertising targeting data structure, comprising a plurality of entries, each entry corresponding to a user and containing:

information identifying a test group to which the user belongs, the identified test group having been selected for the user without regard for user profile information, the identified test group indicating which of a plurality of sequences of conditions will be applied when an advertising request originating with the user is received; and

for each of the conditions of the indicated sequence of conditions, information identifying a treatment subgroup to which the user belongs, the identified treatment subgroup having been selected for the user without regard for user profile information, the identified treatment subgroup indicating which of a plurality of advertising treatments will be applied when the condition is the first condition in the sequence of conditions to be satisfied.

The prior art references of record relied upon by the examiner in rejecting the appealed claims are:



Lazarus et al. (Lazarus)	6,134,532 (Filed Nov. 14, 1997)	Oct. 17, 2000
Benson	6,470,079 (Filed Jul. 09, 1999)	Oct. 22, 2002
Langheinrich et al. (Langheinrich)	6,654,725 (Filed Nov. 09, 1999)	Nov. 25, 2003

Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.

Claims 15, 30 and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Langheinrich in view of Benson.

Claims 32-34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Langheinrich in view of Benson and Lazarus.

Rather than reiterate the conflicting viewpoints advanced by the examiner and the appellants regarding the above-noted rejections, we make reference to the answer (mailed August 11, 2005) for the examiner's complete reasoning in support of the rejections, and to the brief (filed May 24, 2005) and reply brief (filed October 11, 2005) for the appellants' arguments thereagainst.

Only those arguments actually made by appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments which appellants could



have made but chose not to make in the brief have not been considered. See 37 CFR § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(eff. Sept. 13, 2004).

#### OPINION

In reaching our decision in this appeal, we have carefully considered the subject matter on appeal, the rejections advanced by the examiner, and the evidence of statutory subject matter and obviousness relied upon by the examiner as support for the rejections. We have, likewise, reviewed and taken into consideration, in reaching our decision, appellants' arguments set forth in the briefs along with the examiner's rationale in support of the rejections and arguments in rebuttal set forth in the examiner's answer.

Upon consideration of the record before us, we make the determinations which follow. We begin with the rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. The examiner's position (answer, page 3) is that "[c]laim 15 attempts to set forth a data structure claim, but merely sets forth a collection of data elements which are taken to be non-functional descriptive material and therefore provide only a mere arrangement of data." Additionally, it is argued (answer, page 4) that unless appellant claims computer



programming that accomplishes the selection and the usage of the data to select an ad, the claim merely sets forth data identifying user's test groupings, which appears to be intended use. The examiner adds (id.) that

[t]here is no data structure in the claim and applicant's *desire* for the conditions to be applied does not provide any structure or relationship among data elements designed to support specific data manipulation functions.

Appellants assert (brief, page 7) that claim 15 constitutes statutory subject matter because it is directed to a data structure encoded in a computer readable medium. Appellants dispute the examiner's contention that the claim is not directed to a data structure, and asserts (brief, pages 8 and 9) that it is rich with specific data manipulation functions that the recited elements support. In particular, it is argued that the recited information is used to identify a test group that has been selected for the user which is in turn used to indicate which of a plurality of sequences of conditions apply. It is further argued that the recited information is used to identify a treatment subgroup to which the user belongs, which in turn indicates which advertising treatments will be applied.

The examiner responds (answer, page 9) that while the claim preamble attempts to label the claimed data as data structure,



the examiner does not consider the claimed data expressing what group a user belongs to, to be a data structure, but rather a mere collection of data. With regard to appellants' assertion (brief, page 10) that the data is used by the system to provide functionality, the examiner asserts that "[t]he claim simply sets forth the grouping data and not any positive system structure which is capable of: 1) determining the grouping assignments, nor 2) using the groupings to apply conditions."

We begin with claim construction. The claim recites "one or more computer memories collectively containing an advertising data structure comprising a plurality of entries, each entry corresponding to a user and containing. . . ." Because all of the language in the claim following the term "containing" is part of the data structure, we find that the claim is directed to one or more computer memories containing a data structure. Thus, the issue is whether appellants actually recite a data structure as asserted by appellants, or whether the claim recites a compilation or mere arrangement of data, as advanced by the examiner. As correctly noted by the examiner (answer, page 3), a data structure is "a physical or logical arrangement among data elements, designed to support specific data manipulation functions."



Turning to the language in the body of claim 15, we find that the identified test group indicates which of a plurality of sequences of conditions will be applied when an advertising request from the user is received. We further find that "for each of the conditions of the indicated sequence of conditions, information identifying a treatment subgroup to which the user belongs . . . and that the identified treatment subgroup indicates which of a plurality of advertising treatments will be applied when the condition is the first condition in the sequence of conditions to be satisfied." Because the identified test group indicates which of a plurality of sequences of conditions will be applied, and the identified treatment subgroup indicates which of a plurality of treatments will be applied when the condition is the first condition in the sequence to be satisfied, we find a logical or physical relationship between the data elements designed to support specific data manipulation functions, and do not agree with the examiner that the claim recites a compilation or mere arrangement of data. From all of the above, we find that the examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of non-statutory subject matter. Accordingly, we cannot sustain the rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.



We turn next to the rejection of claims 15, 30 and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Langheinrich in view of Benson. In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so doing, the examiner is expected to make the factual determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966). The examiner must articulate reasons for the examiner's decision. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, the examiner must show that there is a teaching, motivation, or suggestion of a motivation to combine references relied on as evidence of obviousness. Id. at 1343. The examiner cannot simply reach conclusions based on the examiner's own understanding or experience - or on his or her assessment of what would be basic knowledge or common sense. Rather, the examiner must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings." In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386, 59 USPQ2d 1693, 1697 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus the examiner must not only assure that the requisite findings are made, based on evidence of record, but must also explain the reasoning by which the findings are deemed



to support the examiner's conclusion. However, a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the relevant prior art teachings does not have to be found explicitly in the prior art, as the teaching, motivation, or suggestion may be implicit from the prior art as a whole, rather than expressly stated in the references. The test for an implicit showing is what the combined teachings, knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and the nature of the problem to be solved as a whole would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987, 78 USPQ2d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) citing In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370, 55 USPQ2d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See also In re Thrift, 298 F. 3d 1357, 1363, 63 USPQ2d 2002, 2008 (Fed. Cir. 2002). These showings by the examiner are an essential part of complying with the burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness. Note In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the applicant to overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or evidence. Obviousness is then determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and the relative persuasiveness of the arguments. See Id.; In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039, 228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir.



1984); and In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976).

The examiner's position (answer, pages 5-7) is that it would have been obvious to provide an ad campaign with a series of disclosed conditions to be checked to enable constraining of the available ads to a few highly targeted available ads to provide precise targeting for a variety of parameters. According to the examiner, Langheinrich does not teach more than one simultaneous campaign/group, but rather only teaches, for example, the left half of figure 5. To overcome this deficiency of Langheinrich, the examiner turns to Benson for a teaching of the idea of running simultaneous advertising campaigns to which users are exposed. The results and effectiveness of the simultaneous campaigns are compared to determine the best campaign. In the examiner's opinion, it would have been obvious to have provided multiple simultaneous campaigns to determine the best campaign, as this would provide the left side of appellants' figure 5 as well as the right side. The examiner additionally asserts that it would have been obvious to have provided the random assignment of the user to each subgroup before or after each condition is tested, as an obvious matter of design choice.



Appellants assert (brief, pages 12 and 13) that the examiner fails to show some suggestion or motivation to combine the references, and that some of the features of the claims are not found in the references, alone or in combination. It is argued (brief, page 13) the references do not describe appellants' features relating to test groups, and that the examiner, by comparing Benson's multiple advertising campaigns, is

conflating different concepts and reaching for subject matter that is simply not contained in the references; neither Benson, nor any of the other applied references disclose assigning users to advertisement campaigns, let alone assigning users to test groups.

It is argued that there is no suggestion of grouping the users in any of the references, and that the references do not show where a test group has been selected without regard for user profile information. Appellants additionally assert (brief, page 14) that neither Langheinrich nor Benson mention any indicators relating to application of a series of conditions. It is argued (id.) that none of the references describe appellants' claim features relating to treatment subgroups, and that

unlike appellants' treatment subgroups, Langheinrich's filtered ads do not have the function of "indicating which of a plurality of advertising treatments will be applied when the condition is the first condition in the sequence of conditions to be satisfied."

Appellants additionally assert (brief, page 15) that



claim 15 recites "a treatment subgroup" that indicates "which of a plurality of advertising treatments will be applied when the condition is the first condition in the sequence of conditions to be satisfied."

It is argued (id.) that

while Langheinrich provides specific examples of conditions that may be applied in order to provide custom advertising, Langheinrich does not disclose that these conditions relate to a sequence of conditions.

The examiner responds (answer, page 10) that the conditions are supplied sequentially and any TRUE condition would trigger a random subgroup ad; and that this would occur for the first TRUE condition.

In the reply brief, appellants assert (page 1) that claim 15 recites a treatment subgroup that indicates which of a plurality of advertising treatments will be applied when the condition is the first condition in the sequence of conditions to be satisfied, and that identifying the first condition that is satisfied in a condition sequence is different than identifying just any condition that is identified. It is argued (reply brief, page 2) that

Langheinrich only provides specific examples of conditions that may be applied in order to provide custom advertising. Langheinrich does not contain any disclosure of applying a sequence of conditions in order to identify a first condition in the sequence of conditions that is satisfied, and presenting the



advertising message associated with the first condition.

Appellants add that if there are multiple conditions, then all of the conditions need to be satisfied for an advertisement to be applicable. This is in contrast to the examiner's assertion that any TRUE condition (i.e., any satisfied condition) would trigger a random subgroup ad.

From our review of the record, we agree with appellants, in particular for the reasons presented in the reply brief, that the combined teachings of Langheinrich and Benson would not have suggested the language of claim 15. Our reasoning is as follows. We begin with appellants' last argument regarding "if there are multiple conditions, then all of the conditions need to be satisfied for an advertisement to be 'applicable,'" as recited in claim 15.

From our review of Langheinrich, we find that the reference is directed to a system and method for providing customized advertising on the Web (col. 1, lines 1-3). It is disclosed that it is known to specify targeting restraints that limit the display of advertisements to conditions such as type of browser or the time of day, and specific data such as age, gender, income, etc. (col. 1, lines 32-47). Langheinrich discloses means



for performing a customization process which customizes the electronic advertisements to be delivered to each client (col. 2, lines 56-58). In particular, it is disclosed (col. 2, lines 61-67) that

the method comprising the steps of decoding customization parameters embedded in a request from the client system, querying a database for a list of display probabilities for relative values of the customization parameters, computing an overall display probability for the overall request, and selecting an advertisement according to the display probability.

It is further disclosed (col. 3, lines 30-32) that an advertiser remains in full control by being able to specify an arbitrary number of display constraints.

From the disclosure of filtering advertisements given the condition of the user request, we find that if a single condition was provided and satisfied, the advertisement would be indicated based on the condition being satisfied. However, claim 15 requires a sequence of conditions, and a single condition would not meet the claim language because to be a sequence, at least two conditions are required. With regard to the plural conditions listed, we find no disclosure of applying the conditions in a sequence. Even if they were applied in a sequence, the claim would not be met because Langheinrich applies all of the conditions and selects an advertisement based upon



advertisements remaining after the conditions are met. We find no teaching or suggestion in Langheinrich, or in Benson, for indicating which treatment will be applied when the condition is the first condition to be satisfied in the sequence of conditions.

We are not persuaded by the examiner's assertion (brief, page 10) that "any TRUE condition would trigger a random subgroup ad; this would occur for the first TRUE condition" because in Langheinrich an advertisement is randomly selected among the advertisements that remain after the filtering conditions are satisfied. There is no indication which of a plurality of advertising treatments will be applied when the condition is the first condition in the sequence of conditions to be satisfied, as required by claim 15.

Turning to Benson, the reference is relied upon and teaches having multiple simultaneous filtering campaigns. Even if combined with Langheinrich, Benson would not make up for the deficiencies of Langheinrich as outlined, supra, because Benson neither teaches nor suggests that the identified treatment subgroup indicates which of a plurality of advertising treatments will be applied when the condition is the first condition in the sequence of conditions to be satisfied, as recited in claim 15.



Accordingly, for at least these reasons, we find that the combined teachings of Langheinrich and Benson fail to establish a prime facie case of obviousness of claim 15. The rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) therefore cannot be sustained. As claim 30 contains similar language, the rejection of claim 30, and claim 31 which depends therefrom, cannot be sustained.




We turn next to the rejection of claims 30-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Langheinrich in view of Benson and Lazarus. We cannot sustain the rejection of claims 32-34 because Lazarus fails to make up for the basic deficiencies of the combination of Langheinrich and Benson.



CONCLUSION

To summarize, the decision of the examiner to reject claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is reversed. The decision of the examiner to reject claims 15 and 30-34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is reversed.

REVERSED

  
TERRY J. OWENS )  
Administrative Patent Judge )  
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STUART S. LEVY )  
Administrative Patent Judge )  
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ROBERT E. NAPPI )  
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